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Abstract
Meaning cannot be based on dictionary def-
initions all the way down: at some point
the circularity of deﬁnitions must be bro-
ken in some way, by grounding the mean-
ings of certain words in sensorimotor cat-
egories learned from experience or shaped
by evolution. This is the “symbol ground-
ing problem”. We introduce the concept of
a reachable set — a larger vocabulary whose
meanings can be learned from a smaller vo-
cabulary through deﬁnition alone, as long as
the meanings of the smaller vocabulary are
themselves already grounded. We provide
simple algorithms to compute reachable sets
for any given dictionary.
1 Introduction
We know from the 19th century philosopher-
mathematician Frege that the referent and the mean-
ing(or “sense”)of aword (or phrase)are notthe same
thing: two different words or phrases can refer to the
very same object without having the same meaning
(Frege, 1948): “George W. Bush” and “the current
president of the United States of America” have the
same referent but a different meaning. So do “human
females” and “daughters”. And “things that are big-
ger than a breadbox” and “things that are not the size
of a breadbox or smaller”.
A word’s “extension” is the set of things to which it
refers, and its “intension” is the rule for deﬁning what
things fall within its extension.. A word’s meaning is
hence something closer to a rule for picking out its
referent. Is the dictionary deﬁnition of a word, then,
its meaning?
Clearly, if we do not know the meaning of a word,
we look up its deﬁnition in a dictionary. But what if
we do not know the meaning of any of the words in its
dictionary deﬁnition? And what if we don’t know the
meanings of the words in the deﬁnitions of the words
deﬁning those words, and so on? This is a problem of
inﬁnite regress, called the “symbol grounding prob-
lem” (Harnad, 1990; Harnad, 2003): the meanings of
words in dictionary deﬁnitions are, in and of them-
selves, ungrounded. The meanings of some of the
words, at least, have to be grounded by some means
other than dictionary deﬁnition look-up.
How are word meanings grounded? Almost cer-
tainly in the sensorimotor capacity to pick out their
referents (Harnad, 2005). Knowing what to do with
what is not a matter of deﬁnition but of adaptive sen-
sorimotor interaction between autonomous, behav-
ing systems and categories of “objects” (including
individuals, kinds, events, actions, traits and states).
Our embodied sensorimotor systems can also be de-
scribed as applying information processing rules to
inputs in order to generate the right outputs, just as
a thermostat defending a temperature of 20 degrees
can be. But this dynamic process is in no useful way
analogous to looking up a deﬁnition in a dictionary.
We will not be discussing sensorimotor ground-
ing (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Robertson, 2002;
Steels, 2007) in this paper. We will assume some
sort of grounding as given: when we consult a dictio-
nary, we already know the meanings of at least some
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8words, somehow. A natural ﬁrst hypothesis is that the
grounding words ought to be more concrete, refer-
ring to things that are closer to our overt sensorimo-
tor experience, and learned earlier, but that remains
to be tested (Clark, 2003). Apart from the question of
the boundary conditions of grounding, however, there
are basic questions to be asked about the structure of
word meanings in dictionary deﬁnition space.
In the path from a word, to the deﬁnition of that
word, to the deﬁnition of the words in the deﬁnition
of that word, and so on, through what sort of a struc-
ture are we navigating (Ravasz & Barabasi, 2003;
Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005)? Meaning is compo-
sitional: A deﬁnition is composed of words, com-
bined according to syntactic rules to form a propo-
sition (with a truth value: true or false). For example,
the word to be deﬁned w (the “deﬁniendum”) might
mean w1 &w2 & ::: &wn, where the wi are other
words (the “deﬁnientes”) in its deﬁnition. Rarely
does that proposition provide the full necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for identifying the referent of the
word, w, but the approximation must at least be close
enough to allow most people, armed with the deﬁ-
nition, to understand and use the deﬁned word most
of the time, possibly after looking up a few of its
deﬁnientes dw, but without having to cycle through
the entire dictionary, and without falling into circu-
larity or inﬁnite regress.
If enough of the deﬁnientes are grounded, then
thereisnoproblemofinﬁniteregress. Butwecanstill
ask the question: What is the size of the grounding
vocabulary? and what words does it contain? What is
the length and shape of the path that would be taken
in a recursive deﬁnitional search, from a word, to its
deﬁnition, to the deﬁnition of the words in its deﬁni-
tion, andsoon? Would iteventually cyclethroughthe
entire dictionary? Or would there be disjoint subsets?
This paper raises more questions than it answers,
but it develops the formal groundwork for a new
means of ﬁnding the answers to questions about how
word meaning is explicitly represented in real dictio-
naries — and perhaps also about how it is implicitly
represented in the “mental lexicon” that each of us
has in our brain (Hauk et al., 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: In Section 2, we introduce the graph-theoretical
deﬁnitions and notations used for formulating the
symbol grounding problem in Section 3. Sections 4
and 5 deal with the implication of this approach in
cognitive sciences and show in what ways grounding
kernels may be useful.
2 Deﬁnitions and Notations
In this section, we give mathematical deﬁnitions for
the dictionary-related terminology, relate them to nat-
ural language dictionaries and supply the pertinent
graph theoretical deﬁnitions. Additional details are
given to ensure mutual comprehensibility to special-
ists in the three disciplines involved (mathematics,
linguistics and psychology). Complete introductions
to graph theory and discrete mathematics are pro-
vided in (Bondy & Murty, 1978; Rosen, 2007).
2.1 Relations and Functions
Let A be any set. A binary relation on A is any subset
R of AA. We write xRy if (x;y) 2 R. The relation
R is said to be (1) reﬂexive if for all x 2 A, we have
xRx, (2) symmetric if for all x;y 2 A such that xRy,
we have yRx and (3) transitive if for all x;y;z 2 A
suchthatxRy andyRz, wehavexRz. TherelationR
is an equivalence relation if it is reﬂexive, symmetric
and transitive. For any x 2 A, the equivalence class
of x, designated by [x], is given by [x] = fy 2 A j
xRyg. It is easy to show that [x] = [y] if and only if
xRy and that the set of all equivalence classes forms
a partition of A.
Let A be any set, f : A ! A a function and k a
positive integer. We designate by fk the function f 
f :::f (k times), where  denotes the composition
of functions.
2.2 Dictionaries
At its most basic level, a dictionary is a set of associ-
ated pairs: a word and its deﬁnition, along with some
disambiguating parameters. The word1 to be deﬁned,
w, is called the deﬁniendum (plural: deﬁnienda)
while the ﬁnite nonempty set of words that deﬁnes
w, dw, is called the set of deﬁnientes of w (singular:
deﬁniens).
Each dictionary entry accordingly consists of a
deﬁniendum w followed by its set of deﬁnientes
dw. A dictionary D then consists of a ﬁnite set
of pairs (w;dw) where w is a word and dw =
fw1;w2;:::;wng, where n  1, is its deﬁnition,
satisfying the property that for all (w;dw) 2 D and
for all d 2 dw, there exists (w0;dw0) 2 D such that
d = w0. A pair (w;dw) is called an entry of D. In
other words, a dictionary is a ﬁnite set of words, each
of which is deﬁned, and each of its deﬁning words is
likewise deﬁned somewhere in the dictionary.
2.3 Graphs
A directed graph is a pair G = (V;E) such that V
is a ﬁnite set of vertices and E  V  V is a ﬁnite
set of arcs. Given V 0  V , the subgraph induced
by V 0, designated by G[V 0], is the graph G[V 0] =
(V 0;E0) where E0 = E \(V 0 V 0). For any v 2 V ,
N (v) and N+(v) designate, respectively, the set of
incoming and outgoing neighbors of v, i.e.
N (v) = fu 2 V j (u;v) 2 Eg
N+(v) = fu 2 V j (v;u) 2 Eg:
1In the context of this mathematical analysis, we will
use “word” to mean a ﬁnite string of uninterrupted letters
having some associated meaning.We write deg
 (v) = jN (v)j and deg
+(v) =
jN+(v)j, respectively. A path of G is a sequence
(v1;v2;:::;vn), where n is a positive integer, vi 2 V
for i = 1;2;:::;n and (vi;vi+1) 2 E, for i =
1;2;:::;n   1. A uv-path is a path starting with u
and ending with v. Finally, we say that a uv-path is a
cycle if u = v.
Given a directed graph G = (V;E) and u;v 2 V ,
we write u ! v if there exists a uv-path in G. We
deﬁne a relation  as
u  v , u ! v and v ! u:
It is an easy exercise to show that  is an equivalence
relation. The equivalence classes of V with respect to
 are called the strongly connected components of G.
In other words, in a directed graph, it might be pos-
sible to go directly from point A to point B, without
being able to get back from point B to point A (as in
a city with only one-way streets). Strongly connected
components, however, are subgraphs in which when-
ever it is possible to go from point A to point B, it is
also possible to come back from point B to point A
(the way back may be different).
There is a very natural way of representing deﬁ-
nitional relations using graph theory, thus providing a
formal tool for analyzing grounding properties of dic-
tionaries: words can be represented as vertices, with
arcs representing deﬁnitional relations, i.e. there is
an arc (u;v) between two words u and v if the word
u appears in the deﬁnition of the word v. More for-
mally, for every dictionary D, its associated graph
G = (V;E) is given by
V = fw j 9dw such that (w;dw) 2 Dg;
E = f(v;w) j 9dw such that (w;dw) 2 D and
v 2 dwg:
Note that every vertex v of G satisﬁes deg
 
G(v) > 0,
but it is possible to have deg
+
G(v) = 0. In other
words, whereas every word has a deﬁnition, some
words are not used in any deﬁnition.
Example 1. Let D be the dictionary whose deﬁni-
tions are given in Table 1. Note that every word ap-
pearing in some deﬁnition is likewise deﬁned in D
(this is one of the criteria for D to be a dictionary).
The associated graph G of D is represented in Figure
1. Note that (not, good, eatable, fruit) is a path of G
while (good, bad, good) is a cycle (as well as a path)
of G.
3 A Graph-Theoretical Formulation of
the Problem
We are now ready to formulate the symbol grounding
problem from a mathematical point of view.
Word Deﬁnition Word Deﬁnition
apple red fruit bad not good
banana yellow fruit color dark or light
dark not light eatable good
fruit eatable thing good not bad
light not dark not not
or or red dark color
thing thing tomato red fruit
yellow light color
Table 1: Deﬁnitions of the dictionary D
apple
bad
banana
color
dark
eatable
fruit
good
light
not
or
red
thing
tomato
yellow
Figure 1: Graph representation of the dictionary D.
3.1 Reachable and Grounding Sets
Given a dictionary D of n words and a person x who
knows m out of these n words, assume that the only
way x can learn new words is by consulting the dic-
tionary deﬁnitions. Can all n words be learned by x
through dictionary look-up alone? If not, then exactly
what subset of words can be learned by x through dic-
tionary look-up alone?
For this purpose, let G = (V;E) be a directed
graph and consider the following application, where
2V denotes the collection of all subsets of V :
RG : 2V 7 ! 2V
U 7 ! U [ fv 2 V j N (v)  Ug:
When the context is clear, we omit the subscript G.
Also we let Rk denote the kth power of R. We say
that v 2 V is k-reachable from U if v 2 Rk(U)
and k is a nonnegative integer. It is easy to show that
there exists an integer k such that R`(U) = Rk(U),
for every integer ` > k. More precisely, we have the
following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 2. Let G = (V;E) be a directed graph, U
a subset of V , and k an integer such that R`(U) =
Rk(U) for all ` > k. The set Rk(U) is called
the reachable set from U and is denoted by R(U).
Moreover, if R(U) = V , then we say that U is a
grounding set of G.We say that G is p-groundable if there exists U 
V such that jUj = p and U is a grounding set of G.
The grounding number of a graph G is the smallest
integer p such that G is p-groundable.
Reachable sets can be computed very simply using
abreadth-ﬁrst-searchtypealgorithm, asshownbyAl-
gorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Computing reachable sets
1: function REACHABLESET(G;U)
2: R   U
3: repeat
4: S   fv 2 V j N
 
G(v)  Rg   R
5: R   R [ S
6: until S = ;
7: return R
8: end function
We now present some examples of reachable sets
and grounding sets.
Example3. ConsiderthedictionaryD andthegraph
G of Example 1. Let U = fbad, light, not, thingg.
Note that
R0(U) = U
R1(U) = U [ fdark;goodg;
R2(U) = R1(U) [ featableg
R3(U) = R2(U) [ ffruitg
R4(U) = R3(U)
so that R(U) = fbad, dark, eatable, fruit, good,
light, not, thingg (see Figure 2). In particular, this
means that the word “eatable” is 2-reachable (but
not 1-reachable) from U and all words in U are 0-
reachable from U. Moreover, we observe that U is
not a grounding set of G (“color”, for example, is un-
reachable). On the other hand, the set U0 = U [forg
is a grounding set of G, so that G is 5-groundable.
3.2 The Minimum Grounding Set Problem
Given a dictionary and its associated graph G, we are
interested in ﬁnding minimum grounding sets of G.
(Note that in general, there is more than one ground-
ing set of minimum cardinality.) This is related to a
natural decision problem: we designate by k-GS the
problem of deciding whether G is k-groundable. We
show that k-GS is closely related to the problem of
ﬁnding minimum feedback vertex sets. First, we re-
call the deﬁnition of a feedback vertex set.
Deﬁnition 4. Let G = (V;E) be a directed graph
and U a subset of V . We say that U is a feedback
vertex set of G if for every cycle C of G, we have
U \ C 6= ;. In other words, U covers every cycle of
G.
The minimum feedback vertex set problem is the
problem of ﬁnding a feedback vertex set of G of min-
imum cardinality. To show that feedback vertex sets
apple
bad
0
banana
color
dark
1
eatable
2 fruit
3
good
1
light
0 not
0
or
red
thing
0
tomato
yellow
Figure 2: The set R(U) (the words in squares) ob-
tained from U
and grounding sets are the same, we begin by stating
two simple lemmas.
Lemma 5. Let G = (V;E) be a directed graph, C a
cycle of G and U  V a grounding set of G. Then
U \ C 6= ;.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that U \C = ; and,
for all v 2 C, there exists an integer k such that v be-
longs to Rk(U). Let ` be the smallest index in the set
fk j 9u 2 C such that u 2 Rk(U)g. Let u be a ver-
tex in C \ R`(U) and w the predecessor of u in C.
Since U \ C = ;, k must be greater than 0 and w a
member of R` 1(U), contradicting the minimality of
`.
Lemma 6. Every directed acyclic graph G is 0-
groundable.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on jV j.
BASIS. If jV j = 1, then jEj = 0, so that the only
vertex v of G satisﬁes N
 
G(v) = ;. Hence R(;) =
V .
INDUCTION. Let v be a vertex such that deg
+(v) =
0. Such a vertex exists since G is acyclic. Moreover,
let G0 be the (acyclic) graph obtained from G by re-
moving vertex v and all its incident arcs. By the in-
duction hypothesis, there exists an integer k such that
Rk
G0(;) = V  fvg. Therefore, V  fvg  Rk
G(;) so
that R
k+1
G (;) = V .
The next theorem follows easily from Lemmas 5
and 6.
Theorem 7. Let G = (V;E) be a directed graph and
U  V . Then U is a grounding set of G if and only if
U is a feedback vertex set of G.
Proof. ()) Let C be a cycle of G. By Lemma 5,
U \ C 6= ;, so that U is a minimum feedback vertex
setofG. (()LetG0 bethegraphobtainedfromGbyremoving U. Then G0 is acyclic and ; is a grounding
set of G0. Therefore, U [; = U is a grounding set of
G.
Corollary 8. k-GS is NP-complete.
Proof. Denote by k-FVS the problem of deciding
whether a directed graph G admits a feedback vertex
set of cardinality at most k. This problem is known to
be NP-complete and has been widely studied (Karp,
1972; Garey & Johnson, 1979). It follows directly
from Theorem 7 that k-GS is NP-complete as well
since the problems are equivalent.
The fact that problems k-GS and k-FVS are equiv-
alentisnotverysurprising. Indeed, roughlyspeaking,
the minimum grounding problem consists of ﬁnding
a minimum set large enough to enable the reader to
learn (reach) all the words of the dictionary. On the
other hand, the minimum feedback vertex set prob-
lem consists of ﬁnding a minimum set large enough
to break the circularity of the deﬁnitions in the dictio-
nary. Hence, the problems are the same, even if they
are stated differently.
Although the problem is NP-complete in general,
we show that there is a simple way of reducing
the complexity of the problem by considering the
strongly connected components.
3.3 Decomposing the Problem
Let G = (V;E) be a directed graph and G1, G2, :::,
Gm the subgraphs induced by its strongly connected
components, where m  1. In particular, there are no
cycles of G containing vertices in different strongly
connected components. Since the minimum ground-
ing set problem is equivalent to the minimum feed-
back vertex set problem, this means that when seek-
ing a minimum grounding set of G, we can restrict
ourselves to seeking minimum grounding sets of Gi,
for i = 1;2;:::;m. More precisely, we have the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 9. Let G = (V;E) be a directed graph
with m strongly connected components, with m  1,
and let Gi = (Vi;Ei) be the subgraph induced by its
i-th strongly connected component, where 1  i 
m. Moreover, let Ui be a minimum grounding set of
Gi, for i = 1;2;:::;m. Then U =
Sm
i=1 Ui is a
minimum grounding set of G.
Proof. First, we show that U is a grounding set of
G. Let C be a cycle of G. Then C is completely
contained in some strongly connected component of
G, say Gj, where 1  j  m. But Uj  U is a
grounding set of Gj, therefore Uj \ C 6= ; so that
U \ C 6= ;. It remains to show that U is a minimum
grounding set of G. By contradiction, assume that
there exists a grounding set U0 of G, with jU0j < jUj
and let U0
i = U0 \ Vi. Then there exists an index j,
with 1  j  m, such that jU0
jj < jUjj, contradicting
the minimality of jUjj.
Note that this proposition may be very useful for
graphs having many small strongly connected com-
ponents. Indeed, by using Tarjan’s Algorithm (Tar-
jan, 1972), the strongly connected components can be
computed in linear time. We illustrate this reduction
by an example.
Example 10. Consider again the dictionary D and
the graph G of Example 1. The strongly connected
components of G are encircled in Figure 3 and
minimum grounding sets (represented by words in
squares) for each of them are easily found. Thus the
grounding number of G is 5.
apple
bad
banana
color
dark
eatable
fruit
good
light
not
or
red
thing
tomato
yellow
Figure 3: The strongly connected components and a
minimum grounding set of G
3.4 The Grounding Kernel
In Example 10, we have seen that there exist some
strongly connected components consisting of only
one vertex without any loop. In particular, there ex-
ist vertices with no successor, i.e. vertices v such
that N
+
G(v) = 0. For instance, this is the case of
the words “apple”, “banana” and “tomato”, which are
not used in any deﬁnition in the dictionary. Remov-
ing these three words, we notice that “fruit”, “red”
and “yellow” are in the same situation and they can
be removed as well. Pursuing the same idea, we can
now remove the words “color” and “eatable”. At this
point, we cannot remove any further words. The set
of remaining words is called the grounding kernel of
the graph G. More formally, we have the following
deﬁnition..
Deﬁnition 11. Let D be a dictionary, G = (V;E)
its associated graph and G1 = (V1;E1), G2 =
(V2;E2), :::, Gm = (Vm;Em) the subgraphs in-
duced by the strongly connected components of G,
where m  1. Let V 0 be the set of vertices u such
that fug is a strongly connected component without
any loop (i.e., (u;u) is not an arc of G). For anyu, let N(u) denote the set of vertices v such that
G contains a uv-path. Then the grounding kernel
of G, denoted by KG, is the set V   fu j u 2
V 0 and N(u)  V 0g.
Clearly, every dictionary D admits a grounding
kernel, as shown by Algorithm 2. Moreover, the
Algorithm 2 Computing the grounding kernel
1: function GROUNDINGKERNEL(G)
2: G0   G
3: repeat
4: Let W be the set of vertices of G0
5: U   fv 2 W j N
+
G0(v) = ;g
6: G0   G0[W   U]
7: until U = ;
8: return G0
9: end function
grounding kernel is a grounding set of its associated
graph G and every minimum grounding set of G is a
subset of the grounding kernel. Therefore, in study-
ing the symbol grounding problem in dictionaries, we
can restrict ourselves to the grounding kernel of the
graph G corresponding to D. This phenomenon is
interesting because every dictionary contains many
words that can be recursively removed without com-
promising the understanding of the other deﬁnitions.
Formally, this property relates to the level of a word:
we will say of a word w that it is of level k if it is
k-reachable from KG but not `-reachable from KG,
for any ` < k. In particular, level 0 indicates that
the word is part of the grounding kernel. A similar
concept has been studied in (Changizi, 2008).
Example 12. Continuing Example 10 and from what
we have seen so far, it follows that the grounding ker-
nel of G is given by
KG = fbad, dark, good, light, not, or, thingg:
Level 1 words are “color” and “eatable”, level 2
words are “fruit”, “red” and “yellow”, and level 3
words are “apple”, “banana” and “tomato”.
4 Grounding Sets and the Mental
Lexicon
In Section 3, we introduced all the necessary termi-
nology to study the symbol grounding problem using
graph theory and digital dictionaries. In this section,
we explain how this model can be useful and on what
assumptions it is based.
A dictionary is a formal symbol system. The pre-
ceding section showed how formal methods can be
applied to this system in order to extract formal fea-
tures. In cognitive science, this is the basis of com-
putationalism (or cognitivism or “disembodied cog-
nition” (Pylyshyn, 1984)), according to which cogni-
tion, too, is a formal symbol system – one that can
be studied and explained independently of the hard-
ware (or, insofar as it concerns humans, the wetware)
on which it is implemented. However, pure computa-
tionalism is vulnerable to the problem of the ground-
ing of symbols too (Harnad, 1990). Some of this can
be remedied by the competing paradigm of embod-
ied cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Robert-
son, 2002; Steels, 2007), which draws on dynamical
(noncomputational) systems theory to ground cogni-
tion in sensorimotor experience. Although compu-
tationalism and symbol grounding provide the back-
ground context for our investigations and ﬁndings,
the present paper does not favor any particular theory
of mental representation of meaning.
A dictionary is a symbol system that relates words
to words in such a way that the meanings of the
deﬁnienda are conveyed via the deﬁnientes. The user
is intended to arrive at an understanding of an un-
known word through an understanding of its deﬁni-
tion. What was formally demonstrated in Section 3
agrees with common sense: although one can learn
new word meanings from a dictionary, the entire dic-
tionary cannot be learned in this way because of cir-
cular references in the deﬁnitions (cycles, in graph
theoretic terminology). Information – nonverbal in-
formation – must come from outside the system to
ground at least some of its symbols by some means
other than just formal deﬁnition (Cangelosi & Har-
nad, 2001). For humans, the two options are learned
sensorimotor grounding and innate grounding. (Al-
though the latter is no doubt important, our current
focus is more on the former.)
The need for information from outside the dictio-
nary is formalized in Section 3. Apart from conﬁrm-
ing the need for such external grounding, we take a
symmetric stance: In natural language, some word
meanings — especially highly abstract ones, such as
those of mathematical or philosophical terms — are
not or cannot be acquired through direct sensorimo-
tor grounding. They are acquired through the com-
position of previously known words. The meaning
of some of those words, or of the words in their re-
spective deﬁnitions, must in turn have been grounded
through direct sensorimotor experience.
To state this in another way: Meaning is not just
formal deﬁnitions all the way down; nor is it just sen-
sorimotorexperienceallthewayup. Thetwoextreme
poles of that continuum are sensorimotor induction
at one pole (trial and error experience with corrective
feedback; observation, pointing, gestures, imitation,
etc.), and symbolic instruction (deﬁnitions, descrip-
tions, explanation, verbal examples etc.) at the other
pole. Being able to identify from their lexicological
structure which words were acquired one way or the
other would provide us with important clues about
the cognitive processes underlying language and the
mental representation of meaning.To compare the word meanings acquired via senso-
rimotor induction with word meanings acquired via
symbolic instruction (deﬁnitions), we ﬁrst need ac-
cess to the encoding of that knowledge. In this com-
ponent of our research, our hypothesis is that the rep-
resentational structure of word meanings in dictionar-
ies shares some commonalities with the representa-
tional structure of word meanings in the human brain
(Hauk et al., 2008). We are thus trying to extract from
dictionaries the grounding kernel (and eventually a
minimum grounding set, which in general is a proper
subset of this kernel), from which the rest of the dic-
tionary can be reached through deﬁnitions alone. We
hypothesize that this kernel, identiﬁed through for-
mal structural analysis, will exhibit properties that are
also reﬂected in the mental lexicon. In parallel on-
going studies, we are ﬁnding that the words in the
grounding kernel are indeed (1) more frequent in oral
andwrittenusage, (2)moreconcrete, (3)morereadily
imageable, and (4) learned earlier or at a younger age.
We also expect they will be (5) more universal (across
dictionaries, languages and cultures) (Chicoisne et
al., 2008).
5 Grounding Kernels in Natural
Language Dictionaries
In earlier research (Clark, 2003), we have been ana-
lyzing two special dictionaries: the Longman’s Dic-
tionary of Contemporary English (LDOCE) (Procter,
1978) and the Cambridge International Dictionary of
English (CIDE) (Procter, 1995). Both are ofﬁcially
described as being based upon a deﬁning vocabulary:
a set of 2000 words which are purportedly the only
words used in all the deﬁnitions of the dictionary, in-
cluding the deﬁnitions of the deﬁning vocabulary it-
self. A closer analysis of this deﬁning vocabulary,
however, has revealed that it is not always faithful to
these constraints: A signiﬁcant number of words used
in the deﬁnitions turn out not to be in the deﬁning vo-
cabulary. Hence it became evident that we would our-
selves have to generate a grounding kernel (roughly
equivalent to the deﬁning vocabulary) from these dic-
tionaries.
The method presented in this paper makes it pos-
sible, given the graph structure of a dictionary, to ex-
tract a grounding kernel therefrom. Extracting this
structure in turn confronts us with two further prob-
lems: morphology and polysemy. Neither of these
problems has a deﬁnite algorithmic solution. Mor-
phology can be treated through stemming and asso-
ciated look-up lists for the simplest cases (i.e., was
! to be, and children ! child), but more elaborate
or complicated cases would require syntactic analysis
or, ultimately, human evaluation. Polysemy is usually
treated through statistical analysis of the word con-
text (as in Latent Semantic Analysis) (Kintsch, 2007)
or human evaluation. Indeed, a good deal of back-
ground knowledge is necessary to analyse an entry
such as: “dominant: the ﬁfth note of a musical scale
of eight notes” (the LDOCE notes 16 different mean-
ings of scale and 4 for dominant, and in our example,
none of these words are used with their most frequent
meaning).
Correct disambiguation of a dictionary is time-
consuming work, as the most effective way to do it
for now is through consensus among human evalua-
tors. Fortunately, a fully disambiguated version of the
WordNet database (Fellbaum, 1998; Fellbaum, 2005)
has just become available. We expect the grounding
kernel of WordNet to be of greater interest than the
deﬁning vocabulary of either CIDE or LDOCE (or
what we extract from them and disambiguate auto-
matically, and imperfectly) for our analysis.
6 Future Work
Themainpurposeofthispaperwastointroduceafor-
mal approach to the symbol grounding problem based
on the computational analysis of digital dictionaries.
Ongoing and future work includes the following:
The minimum grounding set problem. We have
seen that the problem of ﬁnding a minimum ground-
ing set is NP-complete for general graphs. However,
graphs associated with dictionaries have a very spe-
ciﬁc structure. We intend to describe a class of graphs
including those speciﬁc graphs and to try to design
a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem.
Another approach is to design approximation algo-
rithms, yielding a solution close to the optimal solu-
tion, with some known guarantee.
Grounding sets satisfying particular constraints.
Let D be a dictionary, G = (V;E) its associated
graph, and U  V any subset of vertices satisfying
a given property P. We can use Algorithm 1 to test
whether or not U is a grounding set. In particular, it
would be interesting to test different sets U satisfying
different cognitive constraints.
Relaxing the grounding conditions. In this paper
we imposed strong conditions on the learning of new
words: One must know all the words of the deﬁnition
fully in order to learn a new word from them. This
is not realistic, because we all know one can often
understand a deﬁnition without knowing every sin-
gle word in it. Hence one way to relax these condi-
tions would be to modify the learning rule so that one
need only understand at least r% of the deﬁnition,
where r is some number between 0 and 100. An-
other variation would be to assign weights to words to
take into account their morphosyntactic and seman-
tic properties (rather than just treating them as an un-
ordered list, as in the present analysis). Finally, we
could consider “quasi-grounding sets”, whose asso-
ciated reachable set consists of r% of the whole dic-
tionary.
Disambiguation of deﬁnitional relations. Analyz-ing real dictionaries raises, in its full generality, the
problem of word and text disambiguation in free text;
this is a very difﬁcult problem. For example, if the
word “make” appears in a deﬁnition, we do not know
which of its many senses is intended — nor even what
its grammatical category is. To our knowledge, the
only available dictionary that endeavors to provide
fully disambiguated deﬁnitions is the just-released
version of WordNet. On the other hand, dictionary
deﬁnitionshaveaveryspeciﬁcgrammaticalstructure,
presumably simpler and more limited than the gen-
eral case of free text. It might hence be feasible to
develop automatic disambiguation algorithms specif-
ically dedicated to the special case of dictionary deﬁ-
nitions.
Concluding Remark: Deﬁnition can reach the
sense (sometimes), but only the senses can reach the
referent.
Research funded by Canada Research Chair in
Cognitive Sciences, SSHRC (S. Harnad)and NSERC
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